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INTRODUCTION 
Belgium and Germany are two federal states and 
founding member states of the European Union. 
As geographical and political neighbours, they 
have for decades maintained cordial, not to say 
excellent relations. Such a state of affairs should 
not be taken for granted, however, as both 
countries face new challenges to their foreign 
policy outlook. Being able to adapt to a future EU 
without the UK, or to an international system in 
which the US and China face off with one 
another for technological and geopolitical 
advantage, is of central importance to Brussels 
and to Berlin.1 To some extent this may become 
a matter of making political choices. For both 
countries, ‘being European’ is not just a matter of 
geography. It is also the only way to guarantee 
that Europe continues to play a role in setting 
international standards, offering an attractive 
countermodel to the economic sanctions of 
President Trump and the state capitalism of 
China. Because its prosperity and security are tied 
to the rules-based international order, German 
Foreign Minister Heiko Maas argued, Europe has 
to be able to define and execute its own foreign 
policy – based on core values such as democracy, 
rule of law, tolerance and fundamental rights.2 
This challenge also encompasses nurturing a 
healthy social-economic tissue conducive to 
European cooperation in a more contested 
world. As such, the concern that both countries 
share about upgrading their economic 
infrastructure constitutes the structural 
background to a vibrant bilateral relationship. 
Such a debate is not meant to be exclusively 
On 18 March 2019 the fifth edition of the 
Belgo-German Conference took place in 
Brussels. Framed around the inter-related 
themes of energy, mobility and 
digitalization, the conference sought to 
provide a platform for dialogue between 
political leaders, diplomatic officials, and 
representatives from the private sector, 
academia and civil society. This European 
Policy Brief aims to illuminate the major 
topics that were discussed at the conference 
and put these into a wider context. The 
umbrella theme of connectivity in 
infrastructure speaks to the common 
ambition that Belgium and Germany share: 
propelling the European project forward – 
even when facing headwinds – by embracing 
increased economic interdependence. 
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limited to both countries, but rather to provide a 
laboratory for expressing ideas. The aim is to 
identify common concerns whilst pursuing 
European solutions and working towards crucial 
objectives such as the completion of the Energy 
Union and the digital single market 
This European Policy Brief will review the three 
major themes that were discussed at the fifth 
Belgo-German conference, which all have to do 
with preparing the two countries for the future.3 
Firstly, both countries are operationalizing the 
major shifts that have been decided upon in 
terms of their respective energy policies. The 
step-by-step process of connecting the Belgian 
and German electricity grids constitutes a major 
flagship in this regard. Secondly, novel 
approaches to mobility are needed to maintain 
traffic congestion at acceptable levels and allow 
for sustainable and qualitative growth. This 
encompasses not only the trend towards having 
ever more electric cars on the road, but also the 
upgrading of railway and inland shipping 
networks, making full use of digitalisation, 
automation and other new technologies. Linking 
Belgian ports to the German Ruhr Area and 
beyond is of critical importance to all regions 
involved. Thirdly, both the German and Belgian 
economies are in the process of adapting to the 
digital transformation. This brings about 
economic opportunities and regulatory 
challenges alike, in which the management of 
human capital will be key. As all three themes 
relate to connectivity across geographical and 
sector-specific boundaries, the notion of 
increasing European economic interdependence 
constitutes a red thread throughout the 
discussion. 
SUPPLYING SECURE AND SUSTAINABLE 
ENERGY NEEDS 
In 2018, construction works began for 
connecting the Belgian and German electricity 
grids. The so-called ALEGrO project, enabling 
the transmission of 1000 MW through two 
subterranean cables laid across a distance of 90 
kilometres and 14 different communes, serves to 
better integrate renewable energy production 
capacity, enable the convergence of electricity 
prices and ensure a greater security of supply.4 As 
such, it symbolizes many of the challenges 
Germany and Belgium encounter on their 
respective paths towards energy transformation 
(Energiewende). These range from jointly managing 
major change to the energy mix, connecting and 
at the same time decentralizing grid structures, 
and striving towards greater European 
consistency in terms of standards and licensing. 
Both Germany and Belgium are pursuing a 
gradual phasing out of nuclear energy whilst 
simultaneously decarbonizing their economies. 
To this purpose, renewable energy production 
capacity is being increased and electricity grids are 
being reconfigured to transport energy from 
producers to consumers wherever these are 
located. For both countries, this effectively 
amounts to a generational change, producing 
challenges that are similar in nature but 
asymmetric in their impact. Germany today 
obtains about 12% of its electricity from nuclear 
reactors and 40% from coal. Belgium, in turn, 
obtains over 50% of its electricity from nuclear 
plants and 26% from natural gas, imported 
through the North Sea network and the LNG 
terminals in Zeebrugge. As a result, switching to 
rely primarily on gas power plants represents a 
partial step towards decarbonisation for 
Germany – albeit at the cost of increasing its 
dependence on imports – whilst a similar step 
would actually increase carbon emissions for 
Belgium. It can therefore be expected that 
Belgium’s nuclear phase-out will take place over 
a longer time horizon in order to ensure the 
security of supply, in full respect of the highest 
safety standards. Through its MYRRHA research 
installation, furthermore, Belgium leads the way 
in developing technologies for nuclear waste 
processing through transmutation and 
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developing advanced reactors cooled by lead-
bismuth.5 These are areas of potential interest to 
Germany as well. 
As the relative shares of wind and solar energy 
increase, Belgium and Germany need to connect 
their electricity grids for enhancing network 
stability. Offshore wind farms in the North and 
Baltic Seas are coming to play an important part 
in the energy mix, but the electricity they produce 
needs to be transported to the industrial centres 
– all the way into southern Germany. This 
necessitates building more transnational 
connectors similar to ALEGrO, not only 
between Belgium and Germany, but also 
involving other neighbours and the Scandinavian 
countries. In addition, Germany and Belgium 
have a common interest in developing future 
battery technologies for storage as well as 
mobility purposes. Enhancing private sector 
expertise in battery technologies is of key 
importance to avoid the growing battery market 
becoming dominated by Chinese exports. 
Furthermore, increasing electricity storage 
capacity will provide for an additional layer of 
network stability when moving toward more 
decentralized electricity grids, arguably one of the 
coming megatrends. 
Changes to a country’s energy infrastructure 
necessarily unfold over a long timeframe. The 
ALEGrO experience offers a good illustration: 
the first phase was already initiated in 2013 and 
the project is set to be completed 2020. The 
process of obtaining the necessary licenses and 
overcoming the ‘not in my backyard’ 
phenomenon takes time. This offers a useful 
reminder that the European-level harmonization 
of licensing procedures would be a welcome step 
in overcoming the largely invisible fragmentation 
of the European single market. After all, 
conducting multiple licensing procedures in 
parallel takes time as well as resources, implying a 
major competitive disadvantage compared with 
infrastructure projects in China. In this regard, 
the European Commission could propose new 
legislation setting higher and transnational 
licensing standards, Europeanising mindsets and 
removing administrative bottlenecks. 
JOINTLY MANAGING THE MOBILITY 
FLOWS OF THE 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY 
Mobility is at the very core of the European 
project. Without the freedom to travel and trade 
across European borders, there effectively exists 
no Union. The Benelux countries, France, 
Germany pioneered these ideas through the 
customs union (including Italy) and the Schengen 
Agreement. This most densely populated, 
urbanized and industrialized geographical 
fulcrum of the European continent is now 
encountering structural constraints imposed by 
the present-day transportation infrastructure: 
congested roads, railways, canals and airspace. 
Upgrading such infrastructure for 
accommodating still higher transport volumes, 
jointly managing transnational traffic flows and 
completing the associated transitions in city 
design and lifestyle, constitutes a joint set of 
challenges for Belgium, Germany and other 
neighbouring states alike. 
On 18 January 2019, the regions of North Rhine-
Westphalia and Flanders signed a declaration of 
intent about mobility and traffic.6 Given that the 
seaport of Antwerp constitutes one of the 
principal doorways to the industrial heartland of 
Germany, this is hardly a cause for surprise. The 
associated cargo volumes continue to increase: 
freight traffic from Antwerp to Germany is 
expected to grow from 64 to 90 million metric 
tons between now and 2030. About half of this 
prospective increase is set to be transported by 
barge. Inland shipping systems therefore need to 
become increasingly automated and enabled by 
digitized transport documentation in order to 
avoid clogging the available waterways. Yet as 
lorry traffic is already at very high levels (over 30 
million metric tons today), there exists no viable 
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alternative but to diversify away from the road to 
inland shipping and rail transport. 
The so-called ‘Iron Rhine’ railway constitutes an 
old debate between Belgium, Germany and the 
Netherlands.7 This rail link between Antwerp and 
Mönchengladbach, traversing the Dutch 
province of Limburg, offers the shortest route for 
transporting cargo, yet has been out of use since 
1991. The ongoing debate about weighing 
environmental considerations (voiced by the 
Netherlands) vs the mobility concerns (with 
strategic implications for Belgium) has caused 
gridlock for too long. A study co-financed by the 
European Commission exploring a compromise 
solution, the so-called “3RX” Rhein-Ruhr-Rail 
Connection, was completed in 2017.8 Both 
Belgium and Germany are now committed to 
seeing the 3RX trajectory being opened and are 
seeking to secure broad societal support as well 
as EU co-funding. 
The gradual electrification of road traffic 
represents the third leg of the ongoing mobility 
transformation. The German car manufacturing 
industry is now focused on making electric cars a 
customer-driven success by developing products 
that offer comfort at home as well as flexibility 
on the road. Most importantly, electric cars need 
to be hassle-free from day one. This will naturally 
result in a significant increase in electricity 
consumption. Germany is eyeing to have ten 
million electric vehicles on the road by 2030, an 
objective to which the Audi e-mobility factory in 
Brussels will contribute its fair share. While such 
an increase is manageable from a production 
perspective, it also requires developing the 
necessary infrastructure for distribution. At the 
port of Zeebrugge a large-scale charging island 
has already been constructed, and the Ionity 
network – a joint venture of BMW Group, 
Daimler AG, Ford Motor Company, and 
Volkswagen Group with Audi and Porsche – 
aims to build a high-power charging network for 
electric vehicles along major highways in Europe. 
Again, such infrastructure initiatives are 
contingent on European-level standardisation in 
order to become a success. Such standardisation 
relates not just to technical specifications, but 
also to the data privacy issues that the 
digitalisation of mobility entails. The Benelux 
pilot project relating to digital documentation for 
lorry transportation constitutes a case in point, 
dramatically reducing the administrative burden 
on transnational transporters.9 Managing 
mobility in the 21st century will be all about the 
digital transformation, networking the system 
based on available data flows. 
HARNESSING THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION 
THROUGH DATA SCIENCE AND SKILLS  
The digitalisation of their economies represents 
the most amorphous challenge Belgium and 
Germany face today. Markets may have gone 
largely digital already, yet the existing regulatory 
frameworks predate the digital era. Despite 
having highly educated workforces and advanced 
industries, neither country qualifies as a leader in 
digital technologies – not unlike other EU 
member states. Today, the top twenty digital 
companies are all American or Chinese. The 
principal challenge is to understand the full range 
of technological possibilities and risks, whilst 
recognising the urgent need to join forces at the 
European level. The connecting of data science 
research hubs across EU member states stands 
out as the most important deliverable with 
respect to the building of a digital ecosystem. 
Recognising the technological possibilities of the 
digital revolution is central to the new wave of 
economic innovation. Whereas the development 
of digital hardware used to capture the limelight, 
it is now the combination of hardware, software 
and data algorithms that is propelling new 
technologies forward. Although many EU 
member states already have a national approach 
in place for unlocking artificial intelligence – 
Belgium and Germany are no exception – they 
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individually lack critical mass. This is why a 
common European approach towards artificial 
intelligence is needed, linking up with the 
Commission’s digital Europe programme and 
focussing on what the respective member states 
are good at. In the Belgo-German case, this 
means concentrating efforts on digitising 
industrialised processes, industrial data analysis 
and systems technologies. 
An overarching concern for Europe is to avoid 
getting caught in a binary choice between two 
distinct techno-spheres, China vs America. This 
speaks to geopolitical concerns as well as to 
commercial interests. The recent discussion 
about 5G licencing is illustrative enough: if 
Europeans are not in a position to protect their 
own priorities with respect to research and 
technology, they will find themselves in a position 
of increasing dependence that no regulatory 
initiative will be able to offset. The next EU 
Multiannual Financial Framework should set the 
budgetary priorities accordingly, making 
collaborative research into digital technologies a 
prime concern. 
In the digital transformation, the management of 
human talent and knowledge will constitute a 
bottleneck. In times of rapid technological 
change, it is only natural that many citizens feel 
concerned about the impact of widespread 
automation. Yet curtailing technologies by over-
regulating them could backfire spectacularly. 
Innovation thrives on letting new ventures 
explore the realm of what is becoming possible. 
Closing the digital skills gap and widening the 
pool of human talent will require continuous 
training and educational efforts, but such an 
investment will repay itself over the medium 
term. 
CONCLUSION 
Without connectivity there can be no single 
market. The completion of the single market in 
the realms of energy, mobility and digitalisation 
remains a policy priority for Belgium and 
Germany alike. Yet the European single market 
constitutes not an end in itself. If there is anything 
that keeps the European continent together, it is 
the commitment to democracy and the rule of 
law. Common economic and security interests are 
real enough, but these may not suffice to capture 
the imagination of European citizens. At a time 
when the siren song of national sovereignty – of 
‘taking back control’ – is threatening to unravel 
the European construction, Belgium and 
Germany are steadfast partners in defending the 
European rules-based system. As current (non-
permanent) members of the UN Security 
Council, they resolutely advocate greater 
Europeanisation as a means to increase the ability 
of all European citizens to influence their 
common destiny. 
The joint proposal made by Belgium, Germany 
and other partners to establish a peer review 
mechanism evaluating the rule of law in all EU 
member states on an equal basis is key. “Our 
countries have chosen, when becoming a 
member of the European Union, to respect the 
rule of law and fundamental rights”, emphasised 
Belgian Foreign Minister Didier Reynders.10 How 
can the EU maintain credibility in promoting its 
values and interests abroad, if these are not 
respected at home? The present geo-economic 
position of the European Union urgently needs a 
geopolitical translation. This cannot be driven by 
the European institutions alone: it requires the 
constant involvement and support of the 
member states. The Aachen Treaty dynamic of 
revitalising bilateral relationships can help endow 
the European construction with a new sense of 
ambition, provided it remains open to all member 
states wishing to participate.11 It is in this sense 
that these recent discussions about Belgo-
German economic connectivity sought to make a 
contribution to the wider debate about the future 
of the European project. 
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